State of Utah v. Joseph Ersol Berchtold : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
State of Utah v. Joseph Ersol Berchtold : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Vernon B. Romney; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Berchtold, No. 9265 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3685
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UT1fl I L E c 
srr. 1 - 1960 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
9265 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS _____________________________ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS __________________________ 2 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINT I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S M 0 -
TION TO QUASH THE INFORMA-
TION ------------------------------------------------------ 2 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT HIS RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.1 FOR 
ANY OF THE REASONS SET FORTH 
IN HIS POINT II ------------------------------------ 7 
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEN-
DANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 10 IN 
ITS ENTIRETY ------------------------------------ 16 
CON CL US I 0 N __________________ ------------------------------- 1 7 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
17 A. L. R. 91 0 ------------------------------------------------ 1 0 
CASES CITED 
Isbell v. U.S., 142 C. C. A. 312, 227 F. 788 ____ 10 
Starn v. Ogden P. ~ P., 53 Ut. 248, 177 P. 218__ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
State v. Clark, 118 Ut. 517, 223 P. 2d 184 ________ 5 
Statev. Cox, 106 Ut. 253, 147P. 2d 858 __________ 16 
State v. Erwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 P. 2d 285 ______ 9 
State v. Evans, 7 4 U t. 3 89, 2 79 P. 9 50 ______________ 16 
State v. Green, 78 Ut. 580, 6 P. 2d 177 ____________ 8 
State v. Gross (Ohio), 110 N. E. 466 ________________ 9 
State v. Hendricks, 123 Ut. 267, 258 P. 2d 452__ 16 
State v. Lack, 118 Ut. 128, 221 P. 2d 855 ________ 7 
State v. Lewellyn, 71 Ut. 331, 266 P. 261 ________ 9 
State v. Lingman, 97 Ut. 180, 91 P. 2d 45 7 ______ 4, 14 
State v. Penderville, 2 Ut. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195 8 
State v. Read, 121 Ut. 453, 243 P. 2d 439 ________ 6, 14 
State v. Riddle, 112 Ut. 356, 188 P. 2d 449 ______ 5 
State v. Rosenberg, 84 Ut. 402, 35 P. 2d 1004 __ 16 
State v. Russell, 106 Ut. 116, 145 P. 2d 1003 __ 7 
State v. Shonka, 3 Ut. 2d 124, 279 P. 2d 711 __ 14 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 
41-6-4 3. I 0 ---------------------------------------------- 3 
7 7-21-3 ----------------------------------------------------- 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9265 
While appellant's Statement of Facts contains 
most of the basic essentials of the case, he has gone far 
afield in the recitation of superfluous material and in 
arguing the evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
THE INFORMATION. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO. 1 FOR ANY OF THE REASONS SET 
FORTH IN HIS POINT II. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO Q U A S H 
THE INFORMATION. 
Appellant's main argument seems to be that the 
acts described in the bill of particulars are not such as 
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constitute "reckless disregard of the safety of others" 
(41-6-43.10, U. C. A. 1953), and that, therefore, 
no cause of action is stated in the information as modi-
fied by the bill. 
He goes to great effort to show error 1n the 
court's denial of his motion to quash, but does so 
without the aid of any Utah cases. 
He proceeds at the outset to misinterpret the plain 
meaning of the phrase in the bill of parctiulars, 
u* * * in excess of 70 miles per hour * * *" 
failing to realize that "in excess of" might mean any 
speed above that figure. It does not mean just 70. 
He conveniently avoids a line of Utah law most 
helpful to respondent and offers instead citations from 
Colorado and California dealing primarily with the 
question of speed (ranging from 35 to 73 miles per 
hour). His cases are concerned with whether such 
speeds constitute "willful misconduct"; and without 
citing any authority for his statement, (Appellant's 
Brief, pg. 22) he seems to indicate that the term "will-
ful misconduct" is an expression interchangeable with 
ureckless disregard for the safety of others., 
It will be noted by this court, of course, that 
appellant's cases are worthy of attention only as they 
apply to defendant's own version of the facts; that is, 
that he was travelling somewhere around 70 miles an 
hour. They can provide the court no guidance what-
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ever, though, in light of the testimony of the State's 
expert witness, a Ph.D. in physics, that appellant was 
travelling at least 110 miles per hour and perhaps 
greatly in excess of that figure, and of other evidence 
that this occurred on a curved road at night with de-
fendant driving so recklessly as to be wholly unable 
to keep the car on the road (T. 16-18, 24-26, 292, 
304-305). Apparently, this was the evidence believed 
by the jury, and not defendant's own testimony as to 
a lesser rate. 
Certain! y, a holding by the court of a sister state 
to the effect that driving up to 60, 70, or 73 miles per 
hour does not constitute "willful misconduct" should 
not obligate this court to hold that driving in excess 
of 70 miles per hour (actually, as proven, more than 
110 miles an hour), along with the other circum-
stances present, does not constitute "reckless disregard 
of the safety of others''. 
Fortunately, we are not without local precedent 
as to the meaning of "retkless disregard for the safety 
of others'', the crucial words in the information and 
the statute out of which it arose. In State v. Lingman, 
97 Ut. 180, 91 P. 2d 457, an involuntary manslaugh-
ter case, defendant was accused of driving approximate-
ly 40 miles per hour into an intersection, "which speed 
was excessive in view of the width, construction and 
obstructions of the said driver's view along the said 
highway and the hazard of the intersection * * *", 
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the bill of particulars further providing that the de-
fendant was driving and operating the automobile 
carelessly and heedlessly, with willful and wanton dis-
regard for the rights and safety of others, and without 
due caution and circumspection, and at such a speed 
and in such a manner as to endanger life. The court 
at page 468 observed that * * * The very act 
as charged involves recklessness and a mar ked disre-
gard for the safety of others. * * *'' 
In State v. Clark, 118 Ut. 517, 223 P. 2d 184, 
the court adopted, as a definition of "criminal negli-
gence" sufficient to bring a driver under the involun-
tary manslaughter statute, a term very much similar 
to that used repeatedly in the instant case. There, the 
court used the phrase: "recklessness or with a marked 
disregard for the safety of others.'' In that case, the 
court stated at page 189 that the question was one 
for the jury. It said they might well reason that a per-
son driving 30 to 35 miles per hour on an icy road was 
''reckless and indifferent of consequences." The court 
then stated that there is no hard and fast rule for mea-
suring recklessness. Here, of course, the evidence indi-
cates the probability that Berchtold was driving three 
times as fast as the defendant drove in the Clark case, 
under somewhat different, but similarly dangerous cir-
cumstances. 
In State v. Riddle, 112 Ut. 356, 188 P. 2d 449, 
the court held that where a driver on a curve in the 
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dark, permitted his automobile to go onto the left side 
of the road, reasonable jurymen "not only might 
fairly conclude that he was guilty of 'reckless conduct 
or conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety 
of others', but could hardly conclude otherwise". Here 
defendant completely lost control and allowed his car 
to go off the side of the road. 
This court held in State v. R·ead, 121 Ut. 453, 
243 P. 2d 439, that where defendant's car hit a pedes-
trian, knocking him 61 feet, on a clear, dry, even, 
straight street, not curved, as here, and where skid 
marks extended 1410 feet and where defendant had 
been doing some drinking, as defendant had here, and 
there was alcohol in his car, the jury could reasonably 
find that his conduct constituted criminal negligence 
of a degree to bring him under the involuntary man-
slaughter statute, despite his own testimony that he 
had drunk only one glass and a portion of a bottle of 
beer, and that he was travelling only 25 miles per 
hour. 
It seems clear then that reasonable minds could 
hardly otherwise conclu.de than that driving an auto .. 
mobile in the nighttime on a narrow country road 
around a curve in excess of 110 miles an hour was an 
act in reckless disregard of the safety of others. 
To hold to the contrary would tend to nullify 
the negligent homicide statute and open the door to 
travel at speeds even in excess of those presently con-
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templated by the mind of man on any kind of a road 
under any circumstance of curvature at any time of day 
or night. 
Turning from the substantive law involved to 
the matter of how far a prosecutor must go in answer-
ing a defendant's request, respondent has found that 
the Utah court in State v. Lack, 118 Ut. 128, 221 P. 
2d 85 5, held that a bill of particulars need not plead 
matters of evidence and that the statute providing for 
such bill was not intended to compel the prosecution 
to give the accused a preview of the evidence upon 
which the state was to rely. Nor was defendant in the 
instant case handicapped in any way in the preparation 
of his defense by what the bill contained. (See State 
v.Russell, 106Ut.116, 145P. 2d 1003). 
If, indeed, the appellant was unable to make out 
in his mind a cause of action from the information in 
the first bill of particulars, he was at perfect liberty to 
request a supplemental bill, which he failed to do. 
(See Section 77-21-3, U. C. A. 1953.) 
As a matter of substance, then, the information, 
as modified, did constitute a cause of action and as a 
matter of procedure, appellant was remiss in failing to 
exhaust his ready and simple remedies at the time. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
TO DISMISS AND IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT HIS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO. 1 FOR ANY OF THE REASONS SET 
FORTH IN HIS POINT II. 
Appellant presents a hodge-podge of assertions 
under his Point II, the main burden of which is to in-
dicate error on the part of the court in not granting 
defendant's motion to dismiss or his request for a di-
rected verdict. 
Speaking generally as to such motions, our courts 
have held that it is the sole and exclusive province of 
the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, 
whether the evidence offered by the state be weak or 
strong, in conflict or not controverted. Evidence may 
be ever so convincing as to the guilt or innocence of a 
party charged, yet it is for the jury and not the trial 
judge to render the verdict. State v. Green, 78 Ut. 580, 
6 P. 2d 177 states: 
''Wherever there is adduced in a criminal 
prosecution competent evidence from which a 
jury can possibly find beyond reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime with 
which he is charged, there will no error in fail-
ing to direct a verdict of acquittal.'' 
As to the three questions of motion to dismiss, 
motion for directed verdict and motion for a new trial, 
the court recently spoke in the case of State v. Pender-
ville, 2 Ut. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195, as follows: 
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''* * * It has been repeatedly held 
by this court that upon a motion to dismiss or 
to direct a verdict of not guilty for lack of evi-
dence that the trial court does not consider the 
weight of the evidence or credibility of the wit-
nesses, but determines the naked legal proposi-
tion of law, whether there is any substantial 
evidence of the guilt of the accused, and all rea-
sonable inferences are to be taken in favor of 
the state. * * * As is pointed out in one 
or more of these cases, the trial court had a dis-
cretion in the case of a motion for a new trial 
that it does not have in case of a motion to dis-
miss or to direct a verdict of not guilty. Never-
theless, in either case if there is before the court 
evidence upon which reasonable men might dif-
fer as to whether the defendant is or is not guil-
ty, he may deny the motion." 
Again in State v. Erwin, 101 Ut. 365, 120 P. 2d 285 
the court said: 
"* * * if there is any substantial 
evidence * * *, then the weight of the 
evidence is for the jury, and the court will not 
disturb the verdict." 
In State v. Lewellyn, 71 Ut. 331, 266 P. 261, the 
court stated: 
" ' "It is only in the absence of any evi-
dence tending to establish the guilt of the ac-
cused that the trial court will be authorized to 
grant a peremptory instruction directing his ac-
quittal.'' ' * * * 
'The same principle is decided in State v. 
Gross, (Ohio), 110N.E.466. 
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'An able discussion and determination of 
the bounds of judicial authority in considering 
a motion for a directed verdict is contained in 
Isbell v. U.S., 142 C. C. A. 312, 227 F. 788, 
in which it is made clear that the court in such 
case does not consider the weight of evidence or 
credibility of witnesses but determines the naked 
legal proposition of law whether there is any 
substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused. 
This is undoubtedly the correct rule. See anno-
tation "Directing Acquittal", 17 A. L. R. 910. 
The function of a court in dealing with an ap-
plication for a directed verdict must not be con-
fused with that in considering a motion for a 
new trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of 
evidence. The court has a discretion in the lat-
ter case which he does not properly have in the 
former. The reason for the distinction is that 
the order sought in one case acquits the accused 
and finally ends the prosecution, while in the 
other, the order, if granted, does not discharge 
the accused but merely gives him the advantage 
and benefit of another trial. The rule is con-
trolled by the same principles in criminal cases 
as in civil procedure. And in a civil case, Stam 
v. Ogden P. f1 P., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218, 
this court said: 
' ''It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdic-
tion and perhaps in nearly every other where the 
jury system prevails, that, if there is any sub-
stantial evidence whatever upon which to base 
a verdict, the court will not withdraw the case 
from the jury or direct what their verdict 
should be.'' ' '' 
Appellant urges nine reasons why his Motion to 
Dismiss and his requested instruction for a directed 
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verdict should have been granted by the court. None 
of the reasons has any substantial merit. Appellant 
seems merely to be arguing the evidence as he should 
have done to the jury. Furthermore, he cites no cases 
whatsoever in support of any of the assumptions un-
der his Point II. 
Having now laid out general rules, respondent 
will address itself to certain specific sub-points raised 
under Point II of appellant's brief. 
(a) That the testimony of the officers was con-
flicting. 
The full answer to sub-points (a), (b), and 
(c) is that the weighing of the evidence is the sole 
prerogative of the jury. 
We will assume (but not admit) for the purpose 
of answering appellant's sub-point (a) that the testi--
mony of the officers was conflicting. This constitutes 
no legal basis, however, for a motion to dismiss. 
The testimony of the two officers could have 
been absolutely opposite in every pertinent detail and 
still the court would not have been justified in dis .. 
missing or directing a verdict. The jury was at abso-
lute liberty to believe all the testimony of one of the 
officers, while disbelieving all that of the other and 
in relying for its verdict wholly upon the testimony 
of the one. 
On the other hand, the jury was free to believe 
portions of the testimony of both officers, while dis-
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believing portions of that of both, thus arriving at ap-
parent truth upon the basis of which it could render 
its verdict. 
If the testimony was in conflict it was up to the 
jury to pick out which portions, if any, of that of 
either officer it could believe. It was not the preroga-
tive of the court either to accept or reject the testimony 
of the officers or to assume to take the determinaion 
as to the merit of such testimony from the jury. If 
any evidence tending to support the guilt of defendant 
came before the jury it was up to the court to allow 
the case to go forward. 
(b), appellan( s claim that physical evidence 
given by the officers, particularly measurements at the 
scene, was physically an impossibility. It appears that 
appellant is setting himself up as sole arbitrer and that 
he is presuming to perform the functions of the jury. 
If the allegations could not possibly have been true, the 
jury would have so determined. It was up to the ap-
pellant to argue such evidence to the jury and is not 
his place, now, to urge this court to pass upon the 
merits of it. 
(c), the alleged false premise used in the calcu-
lations of th·e State's expert witness. The truth or 
falsity of his premise is neither self-evident nor con-
clusive regardless how it may appear to appellant. 
Again, this is a fact question and the jury evidently 
found differently. 
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(d), appellant's claim that the testimony of the 
State's expert witness was speculative and thus caused 
the jury to speculate on its verdict. In so urging, ap-
appellant merely argues portions of the evidence. The 
testimony of Dr. Woods was based on certain specific 
research, the details of which were brought out by ap-
pellant's counsel on cross-examination, that being the 
proper way of handling the matter. tJe now attempts 
to use the wrong forum for his argument, having 
failed in his effort to convince the jury. 
As appellant well knows, an expert witness is 
not limited in the same way as an ordinary witness. 
He may give his opinions as long as they are based on 
study, research, or examination, and he may also testi-
fy to hypothetical situations. As a consequence, his 
testimony may tend to include a rather wide range of 
probabilities. To so testify is not to speculate and the 
jury was under the same obligation in weighing his 
statements as it was in weighing those of other wit-
nesses. Dr. Woods' testimony was weighed and not 
found wanting, and it is too late now for appellant to 
complain. 
(e), appellant's statement that no direct testi-
mony appears in the record that defendant exceeded 
the speed of 65 miles an hour. The reason for this, of 
course, is that the actual witnesses are dead because of 
appellant's recklessness. While there is no direct testi-
mony as to anybody reading on the speedometer a 
speed in excess of that figure, it has long been recog-
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nized that an expert, such as Dr. Woods, may testify 
as to speed based upon research made after the crash. 
See State v. Lingman, 97 Ut. 180, 91 P. 2d 457; State 
V. Read, 121 Ut. 453, 243 P. 2d 439. Certainly, the 
jury was at liberty to believe Dr. Woods' testimony, 
instead of the unsupported self-serving statements of 
the appellant. 
This court held in State v. Shonka, 3 Ut. 2d 124, 
2 79 P. 2d 711 that the jury was not absolutely bound 
to believe all the testimony of a defendant and that it 
need give it only such weight as the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the occurrence, including the self-
interest of the witness, required. It said that self-inter-
est or improbability can be used to discredit or dis-
count the testimony of a witness and substantive direct 
evidence, though uncontradicted, may be disbelieved 
by a jury where the witness is a party or otherwise in-
terested. 
We have already cited cases under our Point I, 
dealing with the matter of speed. While it can be 
argued that driving 65 miles an hour is not reckless 
disregard for the safety of others under the driving 
conditions and other circumstances of this case, still it 
would be farcical and the product of a wild imagina-
tion to hold that driving 110 miles an hour or more 
under the same circumstances does not constitute reck-
less disregard for the safety of others, a measure of 
defendant's recklessness being demonstrated in testi-
mony that his car, after leaving the highway, severed 
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a utility pole near the base and continued 69 feet fur-
ther through a field before coming to rest (T. 18). 
The jury, obviously, did not rely on defendant's evi-
dence alone, but took the liberty of believing testimony 
as to a much higher rate of speed. Incidentally, while 
there might be some question as to the speed achieved 
by defendant-that is, over 110 miles per hour-there 
can be little question of the car's ability to so perform. 
A body mechanic testified (T. 267) that without 
having done anything whatsoever to the motor, but 
after making repairs on the car's body, he drove the 
vehicle in excess of 12 0 miles per hour after the acci-
dent. 
(f), appellan(s argument that the accident re-
sulted from momentary indecision of the driver after 
reaching gravel deposits negligently left by highway 
officials at the Hy, of the highway. The jury was 
fully apprised of this argument and failed to buy it. 
Certainly, appellant's argument cannot be adopted as 
a matter of law. The court could not, as it did not, 
have invaded the province of the jury to the extent of 
directing a verdict on this theory. 
Respondent believes sub-point (g) of appellant's 
brief is merely a reiteration of his prior arguments and 
that it does not need special emphasis; and that (h) 
appears to be the same in substance as (d) . 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
All of appellant's requested instruction No. 10 
that conforms to Utah law was covered in substance 
by instructions actually given. 
A defendant, of course, has no right to have in-
structions stated in his own words where the applic-
able law is otherwise given by the court. State v. Cox, 
106 Ut. 253, 147 P. 2d 858. 
It is enough that an instruction properly states 
the law as applied to the facts in issue. State v. Rosen-
berg, 84 Ut. 402,35 P. 2d 1004. 
As to the rna tter of instructions being considered 
as a whole, the attention af the cou.rt is referred to 
State v. Evans, 74 Ut. 389, 279 P. 950, and State v. 
Hendricks, 123 Ut. 267, 258 P. 2d 452. The proper 
law, as concerning the facts at hand, is that given by 
the court in its instruction No. 3. 
The requested instruction is in some measure a 
fair statement of the law, but in part goes beyond the 
rulings of the Supreme Court, as they are set out in 
our Point I. Defendant's rights were fully protected 
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by the instructions given in that they encompass all 
the law necessary to a proper determination of the 
merits of the matter. 
We deny that error occurred. But if it did, under 
all the circumstances it was not preju.dicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's points are without merit and his ap-
peal should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
Dated August 23, 1960. 
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